4 Balancing Between Giants: Mackenzie King, Wartime Rhetoric, and the Transformation of Canada’s Place in North America
Thomas David Hartnell
When considering the topic of “disruptors,” that is, destabilizing events that force rapid change, one of the largest of the twentieth century unquestionably was the Second World War (1939–1945). Not only did that war call for large-scale military mobilization and complex economic manoeuvring, it also fundamentally and irrevocably altered Canada’s international relationships. The Second World War greatly altered Canada’s relationship with the United States. The man tasked with stewarding Canada through this disruptive period was William Lyon Mackenzie King, the country’s longest-tenured prime minister who served for three non-consecutive terms: from 1921 to 1926, 1926 to 1930, and 1935 to 1948. Managing Canada’s evolving relationship with the United States, while balancing conflicting options from Great Britain and his own population, would prove to be a challenging task for him. In order to succeed, King relied on his rhetoric, his skills as a communicator, and various policy choices. He used rhetoric to frame Canada’s deepening relationship with the United States as a partnership between equals despite Canada’s status as a weaker and smaller country, and as a benefit to Canada’s relationship with Britain to dissuade fears of that relationship eroding. King’s skills as a communicator had a large impact as they allowed him to form a close friendship with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, ensuring Canada could negotiate with the United States as a respected ally as opposed to a weaker country seeking protection. The ways in which King managed the war altered Canada’s relationship with the United States, as he employed shrewd policies to maximize Canada’s impact while masterfully using rhetoric to minimize the risks of a potential conscription crisis. Prime Minister King’s management of the Second World War helped to make Canada a middle power, granting it a great deal of new global influence and respect that the country had previously not had. King’s rhetoric, communication skills, and policy decisions allowed him to guide the country through a tumultuous period while positioning Canada for success following the end of the Second World War.
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Great Britain was Canada’s closest ally.[1] Canada relied on Britain for military protection, with the British Royal Navy historically being Canada’s greatest deterrent against an attack from another country.[2] Additionally, Canada’s army frequently relied on British officers to command its troops, and these troops were armed with weapons made by the British.[3] Furthermore, Canada felt extremely close, both culturally and politically, to the British. Historians have stated that Canadians viewed themselves as both North American and British, with a distinctive Canadian personality which united the two.[4] Prior to the start of the war, however, the influence of the United States over Canada had already begun as it had become Canada’s leading economic partner.[5] Reciprocal trade agreements between the two countries created in 1935 and 1938 helped facilitate this and demonstrated a mutual understanding that increased trade between the two was both beneficial and necessary.[6] At the same time, Britain was unable to purchase the volume Canadian goods that it had in the past due to a number of factor’s, the greatest of which were the Great Depression and declining British purchasing power.[7]
US influence over Canada continued to grow as the breakout of war approached when, in August, 1938, President Roosevelt pledged to protect Canada in the event of an attack.[8] This was distressing for King as it came as a complete surprise to him, and in his diaries he went so far as to describe it as having had a bomb dropped on him.[9] King’s top advisors believed Roosevelt’s declaration was made not out of a desire to defend Canada, but rather a selfish desire to prevent an enemy taking a foothold in Canada from which they could attack the United States.[10] Although some sections of the Canadian public were suspicious of American motives, most were in favour of them assisting in Canada’s potentially needed defence.[11] King, however, did not want to appear dependent on the United States and knew it was important to reaffirm that Canada was capable of protecting itself. He also worried about appearing too close to the United States, as many Canadians deeply valued their relationship with Britain and did not want that relationship to weaken.[12] To resolve this conflict, King used carefully calculated rhetoric. In his response to Roosevelt’s statement, King emphasized Canada’s independence, framing the relationship with the United States as a partnership. He stated that Canada had a responsibility to the United States to not allow themselves to be captured, framing this informal defence Agreement as a partnership between equals as opposed to one larger nation looking out for another, smaller one.[13] King also reiterated that cooperation between the two countries would not come at the cost of Canada’s relationship with Great Britain, and that Canada would not lean on the United States, which helped to placate Canadians who were concerned about their country’s relationship with Britain.[14] This little episode would prove to be only the beginning of the changes that the Second World War would bring to the relationship between Canada and the United States, and the rhetoric King would have to employ to adapt to those changes.
Once the war began in September 1939, Canada’s relationship with the United States deepened rapidly as continental security concerns drew the two countries ever closer. Germany’s defeat of France put Britain, and by extension Canada, in a very challenging position. France had been one of Britain’s major allies against Nazi Germany, and now Britain was facing the Reich’s full might without that country’s support. By early 1940, Britain was suffering greatly under the German blitz, dealing with food and fuel shortages, and it was essentially bankrupt.[15] For Canada, this meant its greatest military ally had been completely devastated, and Canada would need to look elsewhere for protection. The obvious answer came in the form of the United States, but this brought with it all of the previously discussed fears some Canadians, including King himself, had regarding deepening relations with the United States. Concerning the US, Americans felt that the two countries should come together to plan a defence of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.[16] For this purpose, Roosevelt invited King to meet with him in August of 1940 in Ogdensburg, New York, to discuss the issue. The meeting resulted in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), a joint defence advisory board between Canada and the United States that still exists today.[17] Its main purpose at the time was to study and discuss defence strategies for North America, providing the first institutional mechanism for coordinating defence between the two countries.[18] This intertwining of their defence was a moment where the relationship between Canada and the United States deepened considerably; however, King was very careful to ensure that the language and policies surrounding the PJBD did not indicate that Canada was lesser than the United States or at risk of conceding its sovereignty.
First, the PJBD featured equal representation from Canada and the United States, despite Canada’s smaller population size.[19] This was crucial to ensure Canada was viewed as a partner and equal to the United States, not submissive to it. Next, King protected Canada’s sovereignty by ensuring the United States did not begin occupying Canadian soil. Initially, Roosevelt and his team wanted to place American bases in Canada, but King categorically refused to allow this.[20] He made it clear that Canada must be responsible for protecting its own territory, while still coordinating with the United States. Moreover, to quell fears of losing the nation’s identity, when King spoke about the PJBD in Parliament he went out of his way to ensure it was not viewed as a departure from Canada’s British roots. He called the Agreement a fulfilment of a manifest destiny for Canada, meaning that Canada was taking its rightful place in North America as opposed to entering the American orbit.[21] Regarding the fears about how deeper relations with the United States may affect Canada’s relationship with Britain, King also had an answer. During a speech in Parliament, he stated that these new protections would actually allow Canada to send additional troops and material to assist Britain, as the country was now safe with the protection of the United States, and that therefore Canada needed fewer troops for home defence.[22] Although Britain was initially worried about the PJBD potentially eroding the relationship between themselves and Canada, it eventually accepted the PJBD after it became clear King was still committed to supporting British interests.[23] This would not be the only agreement that Canada and the United States struck during the Second World War.
In early 1941, Canada began facing another crisis that would require it to become closer with the United States. Once the war began, Britain was almost immediately unable to continue to supply Canada with weapons and equipment.[24] As a result, Canada began purchasing these from the United States in US dollars. After some time, however, a problem began to emerge. In 1940, Canada’s spending on US imports had risen by $400 million, while what it earned from exporting to the United States had only climbed by $200 million.[25] If this continued, soon Canada would run out of US dollars and become unable to continue purchasing from the United States. Britain was unable to help Canada with this issue because its own ability to purchase with cash had been destroyed by the war. Britain was primarily paying Canada in credit and payment promises attached to lend-lease agreements.[26] If not addressed soon, this would cause a crisis as Canada would run the risk of being unable to purchase necessary supplies and equipment from the United States.[27] To attempt to solve the issue, King went directly to Roosevelt, and the two arranged for a meeting at Roosevelt’s personal estate in Hyde Park, New York.[28]After a number of face-to-face conversations, the two eventually signed the Hyde Park Agreement. This Agreement was extremely significant for a number of reasons, the greatest of which being that it resolved the exchange crisis. This was an arrangement between the United States and Canada to coordinate and optimize their production: Canada could now use components built by the United States in the weapons it was sending to Britain. The agreement also ensured that the two countries’ production schedules would be coordinated to reduce redundancy and waste.[29]
This was a huge change to relations between the United States and Canada, as at no point previously had their economies been so closely linked. The Hyde Park Agreement essentially allowed both parties to work together as one united supply chain, which represented a previously unheard of level of cooperation between the two countries. It succeeded in ending the financial crisis, and like the previous times that the Second World War had forced Canada and the United States closer to each other, King would have to be careful about how he framed the agreement and the new relationship.[30] Once again, King had to address fears that the deepening relationship would overtake that of Canada and Britain. When he addressed Parliament regarding the Hyde Park Agreement, he stated that it actually reinforced Canada’s commitment to Britain, as it would allow Canada to continue to supply Britain throughout the war and contribute to Britain’s economy by Canada making purchases from them.[31] This narrative helped to reassure both the British government and Canadians that Canada’s relationship with Britain was not being eroded. Clearly, King’s rhetoric had become one of his greatest tools for ensuring Canada was treated fairly in negotiations, and for removing fears that anyone may have had about the growing closeness between the United States and Canada.
Much has been said up to this point about King’s rhetoric and his ability thereby to ease the worries of the Canadian population and of Britain, but this was not the only use for his skills during the war. Arguably one of the greatest ways in which King put his skills as a communicator to work was in developing a strong personal relationship with Roosevelt. Letters, diary entries, and bystander accounts of their meetings demonstrate that the two men shared a strong and genuine friendship. King went as far as to state that the first time he met Roosevelt he immediately felt at ease around him.[32] In his diaries, King wrote that he truly treasured the time he had spent with Roosevelt at Hyde Park and later reaffirmed this to Roosevelt in a letter where he stated, “The happy memories of that visit will always be among my most cherished possessions.”[33] This was not a one-sided friendship either, as Roosevelt shared the same affectionate sentiments for King. Roosevelt respected King’s political instincts, believing him to be a keen statesman and leader.[34] He also held a high level of trust in King, frequently telephoning him to discuss matters of importance and disclosing classified information to him on a number of occasions.[35] Roosevelt clearly stated his liking for King through his letters, writing that “though my letters are few and far between my heart is still in the right place. I have thought much of you since the autumn and have been wishing we might meet more often.”[36] Roosevelt frequently referred to King as an old personal friend, despite not having actually met him until October of 1935.[37] Because King was so willing to communicate his admiration and respect for Roosevelt to him, it allowed him to foster a strong and long-lasting friendship with him. Although a friendship like this is certainly wonderful on its own, it also served another crucial purpose. That is, it helped facilitate important negotiations between the United States and Canada during the Second World War.
Frequently, when Roosevelt and King did meet in person, they were able to find reasonable solutions to problems that their respective negotiators had not been able to solve.[38] The agreement made at Ogdensburg to establish the PJBD and the Hyde Park Agreement were not ironed out in a tense boardroom, but rather in Roosevelt’s personal railcar and estate, respectively.[39] This allowed the two leaders to work extremely closely and discuss important issues with a candor that could never have been achieved in a formal setting, and by extension led to simple and practical solutions that benefited both parties. Another way in which the friendship of these two men impacted relations between their countries is by the mutual respect it fostered between them. King knew that Canada did not possess the military power or industrial output to rival the superpowers of the world. His relationship with Roosevelt and the respect between the two leaders that it fostered ensured that Canada was always able to negotiate with the United States as a respected partner and ally, not as a weaker country looking for protection and economic security.[40] Moreover, aside from negotiations, this relationship helped to keep King and by extension Canada informed about crucial events. Because Canada was not considered one of the major powers, King was frequently excluded from Allied council meetings during the war.[41] As a result, King became dependent on informal channels to keep himself up to date on what was going on.[42] After the United States entered the war in 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, King’s meetings with Roosevelt allowed him to get information otherwise unavailable to him. This included Roosevelt telling King that he was going to meet with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the first time, that he was planning to meet alone with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, and that the United States had atomic bombs which were ready for deployment.[43] Thus, King was afforded a glimpse into a world frequently closed to him and is another clear example of the deepening relationship between the United States and Canada during the Second World War. Actually, King had a stronger relationship with Roosevelt than he did with Churchill, who King thought was a warmonger, while privately Churchill referred to King as a “little son of a bitch.”[44] That a prime minister of Canada had a better relationship with the President of the United States than with the prime minister of the United Kingdom was a huge change that reflected both the depth of Canada’s new relationship, and how the Second World War had brought the two countries closer. Pleasant personal relationships aside, there was still a war to fight, and Canada had a role to play in it.
Canada made a number of contributions to the war effort which, by the end of the Second World War, led to the country’s new status as a respected middle power. “Middle power” is a term used to refer to a country’s level of influence. Middle powers have influence on international events, just not on the same level as superpowers such as the United States or Soviet Union.[45] This new postwar status afforded Canada much more legitimacy and respect than it had prior to the Second World War, and further altered the relationship between Canada and the United States as it allowed Canada to stand alongside it and Britain with greater confidence, autonomy, and ability to participate in postwar international institutions.[46] In order to have this role in the war and gain this influence, however, King had to manage an issue that had done great damage to Canada in the First World War, namely, conscription. To this end, King relied on effective policies regarding how the war was being conducted and, of course, his rhetoric, to avoid a domestic disaster.
Going into the Second World War, King was intimately aware of how delicately the subject of conscription would need to be approached. During the First World War, conscription had been extremely divisive in Canada, particularly among French Canadians. Since they did not feel as connected to the conflict, French-speaking Canadians, particularly in Quebec, did not want to be drafted into it. This led to the infamous conscription crisis, which saw widespread riots break out across Canada in 1917.[47] Because of this, in the Second World War ,King wanted to avoid conscription for as long as possible. Nevertheless, at the same time, he wanted Canada to make an important contribution to the conflict. King, therefore, implemented policies that would maximize Canada’s impact on the war while minimizing the manpower required. This led to the creation of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), developed in 1939, framed by King as the backbone of Canada’s contribution to the war effort.[48] The purpose of the Plan was to train aircrews for other Allied countries using Canadian bases and expertise. This made Canada an indispensable asset while not requiring the country to raise massive infantry forces. Over the course of the Second World War, the BCATP trained 131,553 aircrew making up 45 percent of all British Commonwealth air squadrons and demonstrating that the program was a huge success.[49] To further support the war effort without conscription, Canada also focused heavily on producing goods. After the Hyde Park Agreement, Canada was in a unique position to continue supplying the Allied Forces with equipment. Indeed , Canada only kept 34 percent of its wartime production; the remaining 66 percent was sent to other Allied countries to support their war efforts.[50] This helped Canada carve out another crucial role for itself in the Second World War without the gathering massive amounts of manpower.
In the same vein, Canada used this production to bolster its navy. Prior to the Second World War, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) had been rather small, but Prime Minister King saw increasing the country’s naval power as another avenue to make a great impact on the war effort without resorting to conscription. King’s Cabinet initially approved a program to produce 110 ships, an undertaking considered ambitious for Canada at the time.[51] By the end of the war, however, Canada had far exceeded this goal, producing 939 ships with 373 of these being military ships.[52] Canada was able to produce so many vessels because it focused on ships that could be made quickly at a relatively low price.[53] This meant that the majority of the Canadian navy’s time was spent escorting supply colonies, although the RCN did play a role in the Battle of the Atlantic.[54] As a result of all of this production, by the end of the Second World War Canada had amassed the third-largest navy in the world.[55] This helped to cement Canada’s position as a middle power following the war, contributing to Canada’s higher standing internationally. But the issue of conscription could not be held off forever, King would have to manage it carefully.
Prime Minister King worked very hard to lessen the need for a mass mobilization of soldiers; nevertheless, the specter of conscription loomed. Had King been unable to deal with it properly, another conscription crisis could have crippled Canada’s war effort.[56]It was essential for King that he preserve national unity, which he accomplished, once again, through the clever use of rhetoric. At the outset of the Second World War, King hastened to assure French Canadians that there would be no immediate overseas conscription. Soldiers were still conscripted for home defence, but they could only be sent oversees with parliamentary approval.[57] This allowed King to address the potential manpower concern early, without breaking his promise. In 1942, however, as the war went on and causalities climbed, English-speaking Canadians began applying pressure on the federal government to send conscripted soldiers overseas.[58] King held a national plebiscite on the matter, asking Canadians to vote on whether these soldiers should be deployed overseas or not.[59] He wished to make it clear to Canadians that this did not mean Canada would necessarily send conscripted soldiers overseas, but that it would give Canada the power to do so. To explain this, in attempting to placate the population, King produced a statement that summarized the approach he was taking regarding the issue. In it, King stated that voting yes was “not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary.”[60] Intentionally ambiguous, King’s language here was designed to reassure the Canadian public – and preserve national unity while also providing an opening encouraging them to vote for conscription. King’s approach proved successful, and on 27 December 1942, the contentious plebiscite was passed nationally, although it was rejected in Quebec.[61]
Following this, King now had the ability to send conscripted soldiers overseas, and he had accomplished it without losing the trust of the Canadian public. Despite receiving the ability to deploy these soldiers, King initially refused to do so, honouring his promise that it was to be done only if necessary.[62] This eventually brought him into direct conflict with his defence minister, and prompted that minister’s dismissal in November 1944.[63] Though, as prime minister, King had the power to order conscription, he desperately wanted to avoid using that power. As it became clear that he could not avoid implementing conscription, his speeches were used as a way to minimize the social unrest that the decision would cause. King emphasized that this was a temporary and necessary sacrifice, ensuring that people knew how reluctant he was to be sending Canadians to fight overseas.[64] He reminded Canadians of their responsibility to their soldiers who were already deployed, and that they could not leave them fighting for Canada outnumbered.[65] This approach worked far better than the approach taken by the Canadian government during the First World War, with Quebec reluctantly accepting conscription this time without the violent riots that had occurred previously.[66] King had successfully guided Canada through what could have been another conscription crisis, and he had done it exceptionally well. Had he had failed to do so, Canada’s war effort could have been greatly disrupted and its postwar position as a middle power would never have been attained. As with nearly all of his successes throughout the Second World War, Prime Minister King accomplished avoiding a conscription crisis through the use of his policy and rhetoric.
By the time the war ended, in 1945, Canada and its relationship to the world had changed greatly. The various disruptions caused by the Second World War, which resulted in the deepening relationship between the United States and Canada, and in Canada’s rise in international status to a middle power had effects not just during the war itself but also for the following decades.[67] By 1945, Canada had made a clear move away from its prewar position as a dominion of Great Britain, and had instead emerged as an autonomous middle power in the Western world.[68] Canada had gained this newfound influence in no small part due to Prime Minister King’s rhetorical strategy and his close relations with US President Roosevelt. King had worked diligently to preserve the pre-existing relationship between Great Britain and Canada, while also deepening Canada’s connection with the United States.[69] He succeeded, and as a result placed Canada as a respected ally of the United States, the remaining superpower after the war.[70] At the same time, King’s policies allowed Canada to make a massive impact in the war, leaving it as a much more powerful and influential country at the war’s conclusion. Canada, though much closer to the United States, now had increasingly less reason to feel its sovereignty was being threatened. And in the future when it did feel so threatened, Canadian prime ministers could and would lean on the influence that accompanied Canada’s status as a middle power to resist it. As a result of King’s wartime policies, and the rhetoric that supported them, Canada became a much stronger and more respected nation internationally.
In conclusion, the Second World War was a massive disruptor to Canada in the twentieth century. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s rhetoric, communication skills, and wartime policies throughout the crisis proved to be central to Canada’s success and its new reality that emerged following the war. During the conflict, King was forced to constantly alter and deepen his relationship with the United States, while being sure to maintain Canadian sovereignty and not offend Canada’s British allies. As the war went on, Canada and the United States went from being primarily economic partners, to forming their Permanent Joint Board of Defense, to having their countries production lines intertwined. At every step, King used rhetoric to ensure that everyone understood that Canada was not becoming dependent on or subservient to the United States, and that this relationship would not impact Canada’s relationship with Great Britain. King was able to ensure this because of his great skills as a communicator, which allowed him to develop a deep personal friendship with Roosevelt that permitted Canada many advantages. Also of great importance were King’s policies enacted during the war, which ensured that Canada made the largest impact possible while minimizing the need for conscription. King’s rhetoric and handling of the potential conscription crisis ensured that when conscription was finally instituted, Canadians accepted the decision without social unrest. Finally, all of the work King accomplished during the Second World War, facilitated by his rhetoric, communication skills, and policies, led to Canada become a middle power after the war. This further altered Canada’s relationship with the United States, as its respect for Canada was no longer just rooted in its need for Canada’s resources or Roosevelt’s respect for King, but in a respect for Canada’s importance and influence on the international stage.
The Second World War presented Canada with great challenges, but under King’s guidance it emerged as a cohesive country with greater influence on a global scale than it had previously enjoyed. King’s careful rhetoric, excellent communication skills, and shrewd policies, allowed Canada to become much closer with the United States without sacrificing its relationship with Great Britain or Canada’s own autonomy. While facing disruption that may have caused a different leader to crumble, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King redefined Canada and positioned it for greater relevance and success in the new postwar world.
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- John Herd Thompson and J. Stephen Randall, Ambivalent Allies: Canada and the United States. 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 150. ↵
- Robert Bothwell, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 64. ↵
- C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 206, 488. ↵
- Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, 126. ↵
- Bothwell, For Better or For Worse, 86–7. ↵
- Ibid., 116–17. ↵
- Pedro S. Amaral and James C. MacGee, Trade, Relative Prices, and the Canadian Great Depression (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2016). https://www.atlantafed.org/~/media/Documents/research/seminars/2016/amaral-100416.pd ↵
- Neville Thompson, The Third Man: Churchill, Roosevelt, Mackenzie King, and the Untold Friendships That Won WWII (Toronto: Sutherland House Books, 2021), 89. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- David Reed, Behind Closed Doors: The Personal Relationship Between Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt (Master’s thesis, University of Calgary, 2021), 85. ↵
- Thompson, Third Man, 89; Galen Roger Perras, Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933–1945: Necessary, but Not Necessary Enough (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 44. ↵
- Bothwell, For Better or For Worse, 126–7. ↵
- Thompson, Third Man, 89. ↵
- Bothwell, For Better or For Worse, 126–7. ↵
- Thompson, Third Man, 161–3. ↵
- Bothwell, For Better or For Worse, 138–44. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- H.L. Keenleyside, “The Canada–United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940–1945,” International Journal 6, no. 1 (1951): 53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40198517 ↵
- Perras, Franklin Roosevelt, 78–9. ↵
- Allan Levine, A Life Guided by the Hand of Destiny: The Life of William Lyon Mackenzie King (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011), 314. ↵
- Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, 154. ↵
- Perras, Franklin Roosevelt, 44. ↵
- Desmond Morton, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939–1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 134–6. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Thompson, Third Man, 162; Morton, Canada’s War, 134–6. ↵
- Morton, ibid. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 489–491. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Bothwell, For Better or For Worse, 146–7. ↵
- Brady Stephen Dean, The Prudent Visionary: Mackenzie King’s Calculated Leadership for a Complex Nation (Master’s thesis, University of Regina, 2024). https://hdl.handle.net/10294/16522 ↵
- Reed, Behind Closed Doors, 110. ↵
- Ibid., 142. ↵
- Ibid., 14. ↵
- Ibid., 39–50. ↵
- Ibid., 64. ↵
- Levine, Guided by the Hand of Destiny, 273. ↵
- Reed, Behind Closed Doors, 63. ↵
- Ibid., 224. ↵
- William D. Pederson and Steve Howard, eds., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 136–7, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315290492 ↵
- Levine, Guided by the Hand of Destiny, 316–17. ↵
- Ibid., 316. ↵
- Reed, Behind Closed Doors, 29. ↵
- Morton, Canada’s War, 118–19. ↵
- Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 69–70. ↵
- Ibid., 3–5. ↵
- Desmond Morton, “Did the French Canadians Cause the Conscription Crisis of 1917?” Canadian Military History 24, no. 1 (2015). https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1754&context=cmh ↵
- Morton, Canada’s War, 58–9. ↵
- Brian Nolan, King’s War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939–1945 (Toronto: Random House, 1988), 110. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 488. ↵
- Nolan, King’s War, 93–101. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 315. ↵
- Nolan, King’s War, 93–101. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 16; Nolan, ibid. ↵
- Roger Sarty, “The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945,” Canadian War Museum, 15 Feb. 2025, https://www.warmuseum.ca/articles/the-royal-canadian-navy-and-the-battle-of-the-atlantic-1939-1945 ↵
- Ramsay Cook and Réal Bélanger, Canada’s Prime Ministers: Macdonald to Trudeau – Portraits from the Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 292–5. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Dean, The Prudent Visionary. ↵
- Cook and Bélanger, Canada’s Prime Ministers, 292–5. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 462–3. ↵
- Cook and Bélanger, Canada’s Prime Ministers, 292–5. ↵
- Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 462–3. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Cook and Bélanger, Canada’s Prime Ministers, 292–5. ↵
- Morton, Canada’s War, 325–7. ↵
- Chapnick, The Middle Power Project, 95–6. ↵
- Morton, Canada’s War, 325–7. ↵
- Ibid. ↵