8 Brian Mulroney’s Personal Diplomacy: Canada–US Relations and the Problem of Acid Rain

Today, Canada–US relations are at a nadir. This is quite different from the situation when Brian Mulroney was prime minster (1984–1993), when relations between Canada and the United States were at their zenith, and the two nations managed to forge a free trade deal, an acid rain agreement, and an understanding on Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The relationships that Mulroney had with Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were not without friction, for example, Mulroney clashed with the two over the best approach on how to end apartheid in South Africa, solve the cross-boundary acid rain problem (before finally coming to a mutual agreement), and various other issues. Mulroney’s “ace” was that he was convinced personal diplomacy with his US counterparts could settle any dispute between the two nations and not only lead to mutually beneficial agreements, but also mitigate repercussions should they disagree, even vehemently, over an issue. In dealing with Reagan and Bush, Mulroney understood that Canada’s economic prosperity, environmental health, and national defence depended on a strong, friendly relationship with the United States.

Many Canadians were critical of Mulroney’s personal diplomacy with Reagan and Bush, finding it aligned Canada too closely with the United States. Mulroney moved ahead, however, because he knew Canada’s economic prosperity and interests, among them matters of defence, were unavoidably tied to the United States.^[1] His approach generated mutual respect between himself and the presidents and proved to be the correct path forward. For nearly the next three decades, the respectful relationship that Mulroney had fostered with Reagan and Bush led to greater Canadian prosperity through the Canada–US free trade agreement and to a healthier environment through a mutual agreement on acid rain. Mulroney was able to voice his views, both privately and publicly, on nagging issues between the two countries without damaging the relationship between them, and his persistence prompted both presidents to address a variety of Canada’s concerns and, as a result, protect Canada’s interests. Mulroney’s diplomacy was built not only on mutual respect, but also on deep and long-lasting friendships with both Reagan and Bush. He nurtured his relationships with the two through numerous official state visits, hours of regular phone calls, written correspondence, and even fishing vacations.^[2]

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s personal diplomacy played a key role in solving several outstanding problems between Canada and the United States in the 1980s. Personal diplomacy is characterized by regular contact between national leaders. The most important – intimate and personal – contact is meeting face-to-face.^[3] Nations use diplomacy to influence other nations through dialogue and negotiation, creating cooperation to achieve their foreign policy goals.^[4] A nation’s primary foreign policy objective is to promote and protect its own interests, involving, for example, issues such as international trade, transboundary environmental problems, and defence.^[5]

This essay argues that Mulroney’s personal diplomacy was a major factor in resolving problems between Canada and the United States. In combination with changes to American political leadership and the actions of the Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain (CCAR), Mulroney’s personal diplomacy helped resolve the Canada–US cross-border dispute over acid rain.

In considering Mulroney’s embrace of personal diplomacy, it is crucial to understand how his life experiences shaped his values, leadership, and negotiating style, as these factors help explain how he became attached to such an approach. He grew up in a bilingual egalitarian community in Quebec whose primary industry manufactured products for export, mainly to the United States.^[6] As prime minister, he did not see the Americans as betters, but as equals.^[7] In his memoirs, he notes that his father taught him the values of responsibility, of fulfilling commitments, and of hard work,^[8] while his mother taught him to respect elders and treat friends well.^[9] Throughout his life, Mulroney treated people with respect, which led him to build an extensive list of people he could call on when and as needed.

As a strategic thinker, Mulroney took a long view. He felt personal relationships led to success,^[10] and he started early to build his network of friends who might help in the future. He cultivated an expansive network as a student at St. Francis Xavier and Laval universities, where (as well as later), he held various roles, including fundraiser, advisor, and political recruiter with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (PCP). For the rest of his life, Mulroney would call on various people in this network of relationships to advance an agenda or to contest the Party leadership.

The historian Raymond Blake argues that, as a politician, Mulroney deftly used “small gestures such as ‘thank you cards,’ or ‘flowers …’ to motivate and bring his caucus together,”^[11] to build loyalty, and to amass goodwill. Mulroney displayed this penchant for small gestures on the day he and President Bush signed the 1991 Canada–US Clean Air Agreement. After both he and Bush had signed, Mulroney presented the signing pen to member of Parliament (MP) for the Ontario riding of Parry Sound-Muskoka, Stan Darling, “as a tribute to [Darling’s] long fight to make politicians aware of the need to fight acid rain.”^[12] Mulroney liked grand gestures. He thought it irresponsible to destroy relationships in the heat of a political battle, because one may well need that opponent later.^[13] As an example of this, Mulroney appointed Joe Clark to be his secretary of state for External Affairs, even though before this they had twice fought hammer and tongs for the PCP leadership. Mulroney decided he needed Clark to bridge the gap between Red and Blue Tories within the party to build a cohesive caucus.^[14] He also needed a strong minister in the External Affairs portfolio^[15] who would promote Canada’s new radical foreign affairs vision, a new constructive internationalism.^[16]

Evidence of Mulroney’s belief in constructive dialogue and cooperation, grounded in personal dynamics to resolve disputes, can be seen in his experience as a labour lawyer and as chief executive officer (CEO) of the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOC). As a labour lawyer, CEO, and later prime minister, Mulroney used the “integrative” approach to negotiations. Integrative negotiating “involves both sides focusing on mutual interests rather than a predetermined position.”^[17] The integrative approach attempts to resolve conflicts through collaboration, compromise, and problem solving to achieve a win-win resolution.^[18] As a labour lawyer and CEO, Mulroney “learned the art of compromise and negotiation and moving people with divergent interests and objectives towards common goals.”^[19] He became a “skilled conciliator” and used personal relationships to arrive at resolutions.^[20] Unions praised Mulroney’s negotiation style. Unions felt he did not exploit situations to disadvantage them, and they considered Mulroney to be an honest adversary whom they could trust to do business with to arrive at an acceptable contract.^[21] Mulroney collaborated, compromised, and problem-solved during negotiations, but he also competed when he felt his position was at stake. When Canada and the United States disagreed, for example, on the “binding dispute settlement mechanism” during free trade negotiations that led to an agreement in 1988, Mulroney told the US negotiators the talks were over unless they accepted Canada’s position.^[22] The Americans acquiesced, perhaps because Mulroney’s integrative approach encouraged trust between the parties. Moreover, his personal diplomacy with President Reagan, which developed into a lifelong friendship, permitted Mulroney as prime minister to be forthright with the US negotiating team and secure the concession needed to protect Canada’s economic interests.^[23] By that point, Mulroney could pick up the telephone and reach the US President at any time.

On becoming CEO of the Iron Ore Company of Canada, Mulroney had assessed the company and concluded that the us (management) vs. them (union) approach had to be abandoned, because it hurt worker morale and the company’s bottom line.^[24] His transformational vision meant that every employee would be treated with dignity and shown appreciation. He was convinced that the IOC had an obligation to provide “job security” in a safe and productive workplace. He also demanded that the company return to profitability so shareholders could receive dividends.^[25] Mulroney faced pushback from senior management about the proposed new relationship with labour, but he stood firm and declared that any manager who abused the union or its employees would be fired.^[26] He insisted on “sensible, reasonable, and enlightened management.”^[27] Through negotiations, the IOC and the union worked towards this vision. Mulroney transformed the company, and employee accidental deaths, for instance, decreased from three in 1974 to zero between 1977 and 1982.^[28] Furthermore, the IOC paid more in dividends to shareholders from 1977 to 1982 than in the previous twenty years combined.^[29]

Another benefit Mulroney enjoyed as the IOC’s CEO was the opportunity to travel and interact with Canadian, American, and other international business leaders.^[30] His travels helped him realize that Canada was underperforming in the global marketplace, and he worked on expanding his political and business network.^[31] He felt that Canada was alienated from the world because of the Liberal government’s policies.^[32] He also observed that Canadian business was run by a closed, small cabal of leaders^[33] out to protect their own interests. He learned “about the interdependence of [the Canadian and American] economies.”^[34] In particular, Mulroney learned about American conservatism and business through his frequent interactions with the IOC’s American corporate head, the M.A. Hannah Company, whose president Robert Anderson believed “Brian learned a lot from [Hannah]. He learned how to operate” and learned “how to make money”^[35] in an American business environment. Furthermore, Mulroney developed “an uncanny grasp of American politics and American politicians, which was why his counsel was unfailingly pertinent.”^[36] Hence, when he and Reagan met for the first time, Mulroney was able to charm the President by expressing his conservative views on the free world, free markets, and free trade.

Mulroney’s personal diplomacy did have limits. In one-on-one situations, it is easy to express one’s goals and needs, and as a result, the negotiating parties can collaborate or compromise with ease to arrive at an amicable resolution. When negotiations involve more than two parties, however, the needs and goals of the parties grow exponentially, making it harder for personal diplomacy to succeed. Later, Mulroney learned from the Meech Lake Accord the limits of personal diplomacy. Though he brought the ten provincial premiers together to negotiate, collaborate, and compromise to modify Canada’s Constitution, the Meech Lake Accord failed because two provinces, and many Canadians, were dissatisfied with the compromises that had been reached in satisfying Quebec.

Brian Mulroney cultivated a relationship with President Reagan even before he became prime minister. The two met for the first time at the White House in June 1984, while Mulroney was still leader of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition. Donald Abelson argues that Mulroney believed Reagan was a visionary leader and that he understood and appreciated the burdens and responsibilities the President had in world affairs.^[37] Similarly, Reagan believed Mulroney understood the importance of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Canada.^[38] The relationship started with mutual respect, and although it blossomed, it would need “prudent and careful management.”^[39]

Given the difficulties experienced with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Mulroney was a breath of fresh air for the Reagan administration. Trudeau and Reagan did not see eye to eye on issues such as Canada’s National Energy Program (NEP), its Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), and defence spending, all policies that helped to fulfil Trudeau’s nationalistic ambitions.^[40] Other unresolved issues, as well, such as the Atlantic and Pacific fisheries, Arctic sovereignty, and acid rain, had helped to put a further chill on that relationship.

While he was Opposition leader, Mulroney exploited the ongoing animosity between the governing Liberals and the White House. During the 1984 national election campaign, he criticized Trudeau’s relationship with Washington. If elected, Mulroney promised a “new era of civility between Canada and the US.”^[41] He further stated that under his leadership, Canada would support US global policy and increase Canada’s defence spending.^[42] Both of these announcements did not go unnoticed by the White House, thereby, furthering the goodwill between Mulroney and Reagan. In his government’s first Throne Speech, Mulroney reiterated his commitment to his election talking points. He said his government’s “main objectives … are clear: to defend freedom and preserve peace … to improve trade relations; to build a healthier world economy. For Canada, the way to these objectives lies in concerted action with other nations.”^[43]

Shortly after the Throne Speech, Mulroney courted Reagan again, when in a presentation to the Economic Club of New York on 10 December 1984, he declared Canada’s desire to cooperate on “trade, defence, investment, and border policy.”^[44] He announced that “Canada is open for business again. The government is there to assist –and not – harass the private sector in creating wealth and new jobs.”^[45] Mulroney put his words into action by eliminating Trudeau’s NEP and FIRA, replacing the latter with Investment Canada. To his New York audience, he said the new agency would only review international takeovers of Canadian firms if the “firms had more than $5 million in assets.”^[46] Mulroney’s words and actions demonstrated to the White House that Canada was aligning with US economic priorities.

While elements of personal diplomacy are well known in Mulroney’s negotiations with Reagan on the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement, what is less well-known is how that approach led to other significant successes, such as negotiating agreements with the Americans on Arctic sovereignty and acid rain. Acid rain was a particularly contentious issue between Canada and the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s. By 1987, Ottawa estimated that “acid rain [had] killed 14,000 Canadian lakes and endanger[ed] another 300,000.”^[47] The term “acid rain” encompasses a complex chemical and physical reaction of gases, such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, with air moisture.^[48] Acid rain is a universal term that includes rain, hail, snow, and fog. Canadian and US “coal-fired electrical plants and nonferrous smelters”^[49] were the primary source of North America’s sulphur and nitrogen oxide emissions. When electrical plants and smelters emitted sulphur and nitrogen oxide gases, the gases combined with the moisture and were carried by the wind from the American industrial heartland to Canada, where the precipitation fell as acid rain. The acid rain acidified rivers and lakes, killing fish and other aquatic life. In addition, acid rain stunted crop and tree growth, causing “long-term damage to soils.”^[50] As the IOC’s CEO, Mulroney had recognized that acid rain was destroying Eastern Canada’s environment;^[51] as prime minister, he wanted to resolve the acid rain issue.

An essential factor in resolving the Canada–US differences over the acid rain issue was Mulroney’s personal approach to diplomacy. At the start of the Mulroney government, President Reagan was the most significant impediment to resolving this problem. Even in the face of science, Reagan did not believe that America’s industry was causing acid rain. He asserted, for example, that the 1980 Mount St. Helens eruption had added more pollutants to the air than did ten years of automobile emissions,^[52] and even suggested that “noxious materials in the air might benefit tubercular patients.”^[53] Reagan accused Canadian industry of causing the acid rain that was destroying forests and vegetation in Eastern Canada. It should be noted that, in the early 1980s, the United States was mired in a deep recession, and Reagan, American businesses, and the American public all feared that regulating fossil fuels and air pollution would deepen the recession and further damage the industrial Midwest.^[54]

Mulroney understood the headwinds he faced in changing Reagan, the US Congress, and American business attitudes regarding acid rain. He took a long-term view towards resolving the conflict and employed personal diplomacy to win incremental concessions and action from both Reagan and Bush. According to Fen Osler Hampson, Mulroney realized after his 1984 meeting with Reagan in Washington that if it wanted the Americans to take acid rain seriously, Canada had to take action to curb its own acid rain emissions.^[55] Accordingly, the Mulroney government took incremental steps to address the source of acid rain in Canada. The first such step was the “Clean Hands” policy, with the primary goal of reducing pollutants from Canadian industry that were contributing to acid rain. That policy approach allowed Mulroney to demonstrate to the Americans, with empirical evidence, that Canada was not the sole cause of acid rain.^[56] Mulroney’s impetus for the “Clean Hands” policy was undoubtedly influenced by pressure from the Canadian Coalition of Acid Rain (CCAR), formed in 1981. The Coalition had criticized Canada for finger-wagging at the Americans and for its lack of effort in reducing its own fossil fuel emissions,^[57] maintaining that if Canada wanted the United States to take the issue seriously, Canada had to “clean up its own backyard.”^[58]

In February 1985, Ottawa and seven eastern provincial governments agreed to reduce their sulphur dioxide emissions by 50 percent.^[59] According to Elizabeth May of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the CCAR was a dogged critic of acid rain, and its efforts helped forge the federal-provincial agreement to curb acid rain.^[60] Governments committed $1.5 billion over ten years to meet their emissions targets.^[61] In addition, the federal government tightened regulations around car emissions and contributed $150 million to update smelters in Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.^[62] Mulroney understood that Canada could not plead its case to the Americans unless it took steps to clean up its own act. Even though Canada did take concrete steps to reduce its emissions, any change in US policy still faced stiff scepticism in Congress. West Virginian and US Senate majority leader Robert Byrd was convinced Canada’s actions to impose controls on industry to limit acid rain were meant to undermine the US coal industry.^[63] In addition to politicians like Byrd, American coal-burning utility companies resented any drive to reduce sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions (the two primary pollutants causing acid rain).^[64] American companies resented Canada’s coercive tactics to control emissions in Canada and wanted nothing similar in the United States.^[65] Moreover, the new, cleaner coal-burning technology involved high installation and operating costs.^[66] Up to one-third of their costs would involve reducing and controlling pollution, which meant one-third of their workforce would be engaged in emissions control.^[67] As a result, the American utilities did not want to transition to the new technologies until these became smaller and cheaper.^[68] They fought any Reagan endorsement of an idea to shift to “clean coal-burning technology.”^[69] Consequently, for a long time, Reagan endorsed the utilities’ position, to Mulroney’s consternation.^[70]

At the “Shamrock Summit” in March 1985, in Quebec City, between Mulroney and Reagan, Mulroney once again reiterated to President Reagan his commitment to resolving the cross-border acid rain problem. The discussion took place mainly in private conversations, and Mulroney’s personal diplomacy with Reagan elicited another incremental step towards resolving the issue. Reagan agreed to appoint two envoys to consult on “laws related to acid rain pollutants,”^[71] improve cooperation on acid rain, enhance the exchange of scientific information on acid rain, and “identify” actions that would improve the environment.^[72] The reactions of environmentalists and the premiers of Canada’s provinces were tepid. The statements made by the envoys, they feared, would be symbolic and would not produce substantive action. The envoys’ January 1986 report did, in fact, link acid rain to industrial emissions, but it did not set timelines or targets to reduce the pollutants that were causing it. The report recommended that the US commit $5 billion to help American businesses update or replace old technologies with “clean coal technologies.”^[73] Hopeful of a satisfactory resolution, because Reagan endorsed the report,^[74] for Mulroney, it was another incremental step towards an acid rain agreement.

At the Canada–US summit in Ottawa, in April 1987, Reagan privately acknowledged that the United States was a contributor to Canada’s acid rain problem. At the last moment, he had his speech to the joint session of Parliament altered, acknowledging it was time to conclude a firm bilateral accord that would provide North America with a solution to acid rain.^[75] Before Reagan delivered his speech, Mulroney had spoken to him directly, telling him that acid rain “is more than a Canadian problem. It is a transboundary problem which requires a transboundary response. I urgently invite the US administration and the American Congress to join with this Parliament and government in concluding a firm bilateral accord which would provide a North American solution to acid rain.”^[76] Then, in his speech, Reagan announced that the United States would consider a “new non-partisan accord to curb acid rain emissions plaguing the two countries.”^[77] Mulroney was yet another step closer to arriving at Canada’s acid rain solution.

Although Mulroney influenced Reagan to commit to a “non-partisan accord to curb acid rain,”^[78] Ontario’s Minister of Environment Jim Bradley criticized Mulroney for his soft approach.^[79] Bradley felt that Reagan’s announcement at the 1987 summit was a step backward, and not forward, and he found Reagan’s new position to be a “candy-coated nothing.”^[80] Reagan’s promise was mere virtue-signalling, because acid rain would not stop, and Ontario’s environment would continue to deteriorate.^[81] Even US Congressman Gerry Sikorski from Minnesota characterized  Reagan’s promise as empty, wondering if Mulroney’s soft approach would solve the ongoing acid rain problem.^[82]

Mulroney wanted more from Reagan, of course, but he was fully aware that he faced an uphill battle to move the President on acid rain. Mulroney made his frustrations known when he said, “I can’t persuade the unpersuadable.”^[83] When, in 1987, the US Congress budgeted only $280 million to fight acid rain, Mulroney invited Vice President Bush to Ottawa for a meeting, in hopes of persuading Bush to push Reagan to do more. Bush intimated that Mulroney gave him an earful about the lack of headway on acid rain and returned to Washington determined to convince Reagan to commit $2.5 billion to fight it.^[84] Mulroney’s personal diplomacy and friendship with the Vice President allowed him to speak his mind to influence the President. By giving the Vice President an earful over acid rain, Mulroney once again took another incremental step towards an acid rain agreement.

By early 1988, the political headwinds Mulroney had faced in the previous three and a half years shifted to a tailwind with the impending change in leadership in Congress and the election of George H.W. Bush as President. That April, Mulroney spoke at a joint session of Congress, where he voiced his frustration at American stalling over acid rain. The United States had an obligation as a good neighbour, he said, to address the issue of acid rain.^[85] After Mulroney spoke, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Jim Wright called Mulroney “a salesman,” acknowledging his fantastic job presenting Canada’s position.^[86]

With Reagan’s departure and the election of George H.W. Bush, the acid rain stalemate ended. As Reagan’s Vice President, Bush had had ongoing interactions with Mulroney. According to Mulroney, every time he visited Washington, he would meet with Bush at his home. There, they developed a lifelong friendship, and Mulroney learned in conversations that Bush was an environmentalist.^[87]

Indeed, Bush campaigned as the environmental President. Acid rain was a personal issue for him, perhaps because his summer home was in Kennebunkport, Maine – a state negatively impacted by acid rain. During the 1988 primaries, Bush became keenly aware of Americans’ concern about Reagan’s poor environmental record,^[88] and he campaigned to create “a kinder, gentler America.”^[89] With his election, Bush announced to Congress that he would quickly resolve the issue of acid rain with Canada.^[90] The United States, however, would not negotiate with Canada until Congress had passed an amended US Clean Air Act,^[91] first passed in 1963, with major amendments in 1970 and 1977,^[92] to include a proposal to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 10 million tons.^[93] America’s fossil-fuel-burning electrical plants would shoulder the brunt of the reduction.^[94] Bush had to convince Congress and American businesses to accept his policy initiative. Fortunately for Bush, leadership of the Senate changed from Robert Byrd to George Mitchell, who was keenly aware of the effects of acid rain because it ravaged his home state, which happened to be Maine.^[95] The final figure in the triumvirate that moved the United States towards an acid rain agreement with Canada was Speaker of the US House of Representatives Tom Foley, a Democrat representing Washington state.

The triumvirate of President Bush, Senate leader Mitchell, and Speaker of the House Foley convinced Congress to pass the amended Clean Air Act on a bipartisan basis.^[96] To pass the proposed legislation, however, President Bush realized he had to incentivize Congress and American business to accept the Act’s amendments. The Bush administration proposed relying “on market mechanisms for reducing the nation’s acid rain problem”^[97] and introduced a “cap and trade” system, whereby the “government [set] the maximum amount [sic] of tons of pollution that polluters [could] emit … These tons [were] then auctioned off to the highest bidder at a market-clearing price per ton of emissions [that was] established.”^[98] Hence, the utilities would find the most “cost-effective strategy” to lower their emissions when faced with higher expenses for emitting sulphur oxide.^[99] “Cost-effective strategies” might include closing plants, burning cleaner coal, converting to natural gas, or installing clean coal scrubbers.^[100] Thus, the “cap and trade” system incentivized utility companies to find “cost-effective strategies” to mitigate emissions and choose which strategy they wanted to implement to reduce emissions.^[101] The “cap and trade” system allowed businesses to find the lowest costs to achieve significant reductions in sulphur dioxide emissions.^[102] In the end, the Bush administration believed a market-driven “cap and trade” approach would achieve its goals by rewarding utilities that used innovation to reduce their air pollution.^[103]

The resolution to Canada’s acid rain problem has a long history. In the 1980s, Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government tried to convince the Jimmy Carter and Reagan administrations to deal with acid rain. Trudeau’s government promised to reduce Canadian emissions by 50 percent by 1990. It also spent $1 million on a public awareness campaign to educate Americans on the environmental dangers of acid rain.^[104] Canada knew, however, that its pledges and public relations efforts alone would not sway the Americans. The federal government supported the Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain (CCAR),^[105] co-founded by Michael Perley and Adele Hurley, which privately lobbied the US Congress to change the Clean Air Act. Over a period of ten years, the Coalition’s efforts significantly helped the Trudeau and Mulroney governments resolve what Liberal Minister of Environment John Roberts had called “‘the single most important or irritant’ in Canadian and American relations,”^[106] acid rain.

Michael Perley led the CCAR from Toronto, and Adele Hurley led the organization’s lobbying office in Washington, DC. By 1982, the Canadian government had provided the CCAR with $350,000 in funding to pay for salaries, educational programs, and office rents.^[107] Even though the federal government allocated monies to the organization’s activities,^[108] there were moments when Mulroney was upset with the CCAR. For example, in 1988, Minister of the Environment Tom McMillan demanded that the CCAR “stop making waves in Washington – and above all, stop criticizing Brian Mulroney,”^[109] threatening that otherwise, the federal government would end its financial support.^[110] In addition to government support, the CCAR relied on funding from its vast network of partners. In 1983, the Coalition had 42 partners, of which one-third were environmental groups, and the other two-thirds were a combination of cottagers, outdoor enthusiasts, and business interests.^[111] Over the ten years of CCAR’s existence, its partners contributed $3 million to educate Americans and lobby for the eradication of acid rain.^[112] The diversity of partners, along with the organization’s overarching goal of ending acid rain, made the CCAR a potent force in ending the ravages of acid rain in Canada and the Northeastern United States.^[113] The Coalition did appreciate that eliminating all coal-burning plants was impossible; therefore, it offered several solutions to reduce pollutants, suggesting, for example, that polluters could burn cleaner coal, switch to other fuels, or install scrubbers to filter emissions.^[114]

The CCAR faced considerable opposition from Americans, because the US government and business interests believed reducing acid rain pollutants would threaten the economy’s well-being. Kathleen Bennett, for example, speaking for the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), projected that reducing US sulphur dioxide emissions by eight million tons over twelve years would cost American businesses between $5 and $8 billion annually.^[115] In 1983, American utility companies lobbied Congress against amending the Clean Air Act, citing higher operating costs related to transitioning to clean-coal-burning technologies.^[116]

In Washington, Adele Hurley realized that politicians “tended toward green rhetoric but offered little in the way of action.”^[117] To overcome American rhetoric, the CCAR adopted a soft approach to addressing the acid rain issue with Congress.^[118] The organization lobbied and ran media campaigns^[119] to convince the Reagan and Bush administrations, Congress, and the American public that solving the acid rain problem was in their country’s best interest. According to New England Congressional members, Hurley’s approach paid dividends with Midwestern Americans’ attitudes towards the harmful effects of acid rain, as they tended to take summer vacations in Canada.^[120] Moreover, Gerald Dodson, staff counsel for the leader of the House of Representatives on the Health and the Environmental Subcommittee,  felt the CCAR’s main impact was educating Congress on the “international nature of acid rain.”^[121]

Hurley’s lobbying may have been vital to counteract the detrimental effects of Mulroney’s “pal diplomacy.”^[122] In her book, Yankee Doodle Dandy, Marci McDonald notes that American environmental lawyer David Hawkins felt Mulroney’s friendship with Reagan and Bush set back the acid rain cause by years.^[123] The presidents felt themselves obligated to give Mulroney something on acid rain, so he would have a victory domestically, but by doing so, American politicians and businesses opposed to curbing acid rain could argue that the United States was taking steps to solve the acid rain issue.^[124] The Reagan and Bush administrations were placating Mulroney and kicking the can down the road. Furthermore, McDonald argues, Mulroney’s charm and personal diplomacy did not achieve any measure of success with Congressional leaders; thus, Adele Hurley’s lobbying efforts were critical in convincing House Representatives and Senators to take steps to eliminate acid rain.

In addition to lobbying politicians and working with the media, Hurley created a vast network of American environmentalists to help the CCAR raise awareness of acid rain with the American public and government. She felt American environmentalists had the “wealth and independence from government funding and greater access to information” to help the CCAR. The soft, quiet approach that CCAR used worked, because between 1980 and 1987, the organization’s efforts helped reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 12.5 percent and acid rainfall across Eastern Canada by 30 percent.^[125] On 15 November 1990, the CCAR’s decade-long efforts were finally rewarded when President Bush signed the newly amended US Clean Air Act, and then, on 13 March 1991, Bush and Mulroney signed the US–Canada Air Quality Agreement.

The CCAR’s efforts alone were not enough to completely resolve the environmental damage caused by acid rain. More was needed to reach the highest level of power in the United States, and this came through the flattery and friendship that Mulroney had exerted on two American presidents. He used personal diplomacy to change the attitudes of both Reagan and Bush towards solving the contentious transboundary acid rain issue, and his efforts were a success, achieved incrementally. Mulroney’s nine-year commitment, hard work, and personal relationships resulted in the 1991 US–Canada Air Quality Agreement. Nevertheless, the narrative should not focus exclusively on Mulroney’s personal diplomacy. President Bush seized on the American public’s disdain for Reagan’s poor environmental record and a change in Congressional leadership to help him get the Clean Air Act amended, which led to the 1991 joint agreement with Canada. Moreover, President Bush’s innovative “cap and trade” system used market forces to incentivize American businesses to shift to clean technologies to reduce acid rain pollutants. The Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain influenced the American public and Congressional leadership towards addressing acid rain as an environmental issue; its efforts included partnering with American environmentalists to lobby Congressional representatives and engage the American media to influence public opinion. The US–Canada Air Quality Agreement was not simply the culmination of Mulroney’s personal diplomacy; it was the result of the efforts of many invested people and organizations, and the changing winds of political fortune combining to make a difference.

Today, Canada–US relations are at a nadir, but under Mulroney’s government, relations reached their zenith. In his foreword to Master of Persuasion: Brian Mulroney’s Global Legacy,  former United States Secretary of State Jim Baker argues that Canada–US relations reached their zenith under Prime Minister Mulroney, because Mulroney, President Reagan, and President Bush were visionary leaders who understood that the two nations had to cooperate and collaborate to foster economic prosperity, protect their shared environments, and safeguard each others’ borders.^[126]